We study the effects of tax laws on foreign direct investment (FDI) and direct investment abroad (DIA), distinguishing in each case between investment financed by retained earnings and investment financed by transfers from abroad. We find that tax policy, through its effect on the rate-of-return available in the U.S., has an important effect on the international location of investment. FDI in the U.S. is very sensitive to after-tax rates-of-return available here. U.S. direct investment abroad is also affected, although to a lesser extent.
These flows --in both directions --have become a concern of tax policy. For example, the adoption of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) in 1981, as amended in 1982, was expressly limited to investment in the United States. While the primary motivation behind ACRS was to increase U.S. domestic capital formation, a secondary concern, evidenced in the hearings preceding its adoption, was to stem the flow of U.S. investment abroad. Further, FDI is often seen as an important justification for continuing the U.S. corporate income tax, even by those who favor corporate and personal tax integration. Another example of revenue (and perhaps location of investment) concern is the per country limitation to the foreign tax credit in the Administration's tax reform proposal.
Multinational firms undoubtedly invest outside their home country for a wide variety of reasons: access to markets, political considerations, labor costs, proximity to suppliers, and expected economic conditions, to name a few. Often, the reasons may be industry, firm, or even product-specific. Given these other forces shaping the international location of investment, however, tax laws potentially affect the attractiveness of U.S. direct investment abroad, and foreign direct investment in the U.S., as well as the repatriation of earnings and/or capital. The major changes in U.S. domestic investment incentives enacted in 1981 and 1982 (ERTA and TEFRA, respectively) combined with the trends in FDI and DIA, as well as current tax reform proposals which might affect tax rates on DIA and FDI substantially, lead us to reexamine the question of the extent to which tax policy appears to influence the international location of investment.
We begin in Section 2 with a brief literature review, focusing on the differing effects on the location of investment of tax policy toward domestic investment and toward foreign source income. The argument in Hartman (1981 Hartman ( , 1984 Hartman ( , 1985 --that foreign investment financed by retained earnings should not be influenced by the (deferred) home country tax on foreign source income --is presented and some caveats suggested.
Section 3 presents a description of recent trends in FDI and DIA, their sources of finance and their uses, as well as their industrial composition and origin or location, respectively. It also describes the data used in our study.
Section 4 presents our empirical results. First, for the period 1965-79, we compare our results using revised data to those of Hartman. The results are fairly robust to the data revisions. Next, for both FDI and DIA we use revised data on extended sample periods and several alternative functional forms and combinations of variables to test the impact of tax policy on FDI and DIA. We conclude that tax policy can have significant effects on the international location of investment.
Our results are similar to the quantitative estimates in Hartman's several studies f:)r so; of the effects, but they are only about onethird to onehalf as large for others, e.g., the impact of U.S. domestic tax policy on U.S. direct investment abroad.
Section 5 presents a brief summary and conclusion, including rough estimates of the likely impacts of recent tax policy and current proposals on the international location of investment, and an analysis of the welfare effects of taxation of FDI and DIA. 
A Brief Review of the Literature
The effects of domestic tax policy on the international location of investment occur primarily through two channels: home country tax policy towards investment in the home country, and home country tax policy towards foreign source income.1 Domestic tax policy towards investments made in the home country affect both FDI in the home country and DIA by home country firms. This occurs because tax policy alters the relative rates-of-return available at home and abroad.
Entrepreneurs investing capital will naturally be attracted to locations where the (risk-adjusted) rate-of-return is highest.2 Of course, this channel hinges on the substitutability of foreign and domestic investment for a firm. However, the common conception of foreign and domestic investment as alternative methods of producing the same good and/or serving the same (geographic) market suggests that there is some substitution between locations of 1. The home country is where the parent company is based.
2. Issues concerning risk adjustment are not addressed in this paper.
investment. Moreover, as discussed in Hartman (1981) , if there are financial constraints on firms, there will be a clear tradeoff between foreign and domestic opertions. Thus, there are good theoretical reasons for domestic tax policy to affect both FDI and DIA through its effects on relative rates-of-return. Empirically, this view has been supported by results in Hartman (1981 Hartman ( , 1984 and below.
The importance of taxes on foreign source income has long been a subject of debate. There are two major approaches to taxation of foreign source income. In the "territorial" approach, the company pays no home country taxes on foreign income. In the "residence" approach, the company does pay home country taxes, but often a credit or deduction is allowed for taxes paid in the host country. The United States taxes with the residence approach, but allows a credit for taxes paid to other countries.
Research in the 1960s and 1970s focused largely on the issue of "capital export neutrality," the equivalent tax treatment of the foreign and domestic returns of multinational companies. In this regard, it was argued that, under a residential system with a credit for foreign taxes, the ability to defer taxation on foreign source income conferred a tax advantage toward investment abroad.3
This view has been challenged by Hartman (1981 Hartman ( , 1984 Hartman ( , 1985 .
Hartman properly draws attention to the distinction between investment 3. See Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978) or Caves (1982) for a review of this position. Hartman defines firms that finance foreign investment by retention of earnings as "mature" firms, those that finance investment by transfers 4. However, even when the tax on foreign source income is not a concern, it is not the case that foreign firms in the U.S. respond to the same tax rates as do U.S. firms. Foreign firms care about the tax rate paid at the corporate level. U.S. firms should respond to the total effective tax rate. These rates are developed in Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (1983) and Feldstein and Jun (1986) . They do not always move in tandem. Moreover, it would be easy to design policies that affect the rates differently, e.g., the current tax reform bill HR3838. (Scholl (1985) ).
Second, foreign direct investment is not the exact counterpart to domestic net investment figures. For example, inflows of funds (or retention of earnings) are not necessarily used to purchase real capital assets, so FDI may overstate real foreign net investment. On the other hand, U.S. borrowing by the U.S. subsidiary is not part of the calculation of FDI. Hartman (1984) suggests that it is reasonable to use FDI figures as net foreign investment. Hartman (1981) shows that an equivalent proposition also holds for U.S. direct investment abroad.
B.
Trends
Summary data for foreign direct investment in the U.S. and U.S.
direct investment abroad are presented in Tables 1, 2 , and 3.
As shown in shows that the reinvestment ratio for FDI income has also fallen since 1982, though it was relatively stable in earlier periods. Table 2, Thus, even a cursory examination of the data suggests that both FDI and DIA can be substantial. The wide swings suggest further that international investment flows may be very sensitive to current or anticipated conditions. Before proceeding to a more formal analysis, however, issues concerning the data should be noted. foreign direct investment) were revised upward by 24%, and FDI income was revised downward by 9% (Belli, 1984) . With these revised data for 1980, the direct investment position rose 52% from its 1979 value, and FDI was 42% higher than in 1979. Note that BEA did not revise the data from the 1970s based on the 1980 benchmark survey.
U.S. direct investment abroad, shown in
There is reason to believe that a substantial part of the abrupt junips in these series is due to underreporting during the 1970s.
Specifically, BEA estimates that about 75% of the revision in the capital inflows figure was accounted for by affiliates that should have reported in the annual sample surveys but did not.7
One additional concern is that through 1979 BEA collected retained earnings for incorporated affiliates only. In 1980, unincorporated affiliates began to report retained earnings too. Thus, the series "investment financed by retained earnings" re below) refers to incorporated affiliates only through 1979, and all affiliates in 1980 and thereafter. BEA presented separate data for incorporated and unincorporated affiliates for 1980-83, but has since discontinued the practice.
To account for the problems with the data discussed above, we have 7. Belli, p. 34 . BEA estimates that all of the revision in capital inflows was due to underreporting, but 25% of the underreporting was by exempt affiliates. For the direct investment position, two-thirds of the upward revision was due to underreporting, one-third due to revision or correction in the sample data. BEA does not state what part of the underreporting of direct investment position should have been reported, but if (as for capital inflows) 75% of the underreporting should have been reported, then one-half (2/3 x 3/4) of the upward revision in direct investment position should have been reported in the sample survey. This suggests that the position in FDI was also substantially underreported in the l970s.
discussed with other regression results in Section 4.
All tax rate and rate-of-return data have been generously supplied by Martin Feldstein and Joosung Jun (1986 In Table 4B , we present basic results for DIA in the 1965-79
period. Here, the data revisions have no effect on the sensitivity of DIA to its own rate-of-return. In summary, except for the I/Y equation for FDI and the elasticity of DIA with repect to net return in the U.S., we obtain results very similar to Hartman (1981 Hartman ( , 1984 , even with revised tax rate and rate-ofreturn data.
A. New Results for Foreign Direct Investment
Tables 5A and 5B present new results for FDI. In these equations we extend the sample forward to 1984, and in some cases backward to 1956, use the revised series mentioned above, and experiment with a variety of alternative explanatory variables and functional forms. Estimates can vary substantially depending on the assumptions made. For 1965-84, the elasticity of (I/Y) is estimated to be 1.0 with respect to its own rate of return, 1.9 with respect to the average foreigners' net return in the U.S., and -2.9 with respect to the relative tax term. elasticities ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 for foreigners' net return in the U.S. , 0.6 to 0.7 for return on FDI, and -1.4 to -2.9 for relative taxes.
We also employed several alternative specifications including a dummy variable to capture the negative re in 1982, instrumental variables to account for potential endogeneity of the return on FDI,
expanding the values of FDI (by 20%) in the late 1970's to proxy for the underreporting discussed in section 3, and alternative output terms.
The overriding result of these alternative specifications is, as the Tables above would suggest, that the estimates are fairly sensitive to the specifications made. Table 6 presents some basic extensions of the DIA results given in Table 4B . The results are presented only for I*/Y as the other two equations fit poorly over the entire period. The I*r equations, in rates and level, tend to confirm strongly our earlier estimates, from Table 4B . In particular, the net return in the U.S. enters with an elasticity of approxinateiy -0.2 in each specification, while the net return abroad has an elasticity estimated at 1.2 to 1.3. Alternative specifications led to varying results, and are not reported here.
B. New Results for Direct Investment Abroad
In summary, our empirical research supports the notion that investment. This estimate derives from a comparison of analogous coefficients on domestic investment equations estimated by Feldstein and Jun (1986) This refers only to investment out of retained 9. This estimate is obtained as follows. Feldstein and Jun (1986) regress net investment divided by GNP on several variables, including the (lagged) overall net rate-of-return. Their coefficient on the rate-of-earnings. It is likely that transfers from domestic parent companies to foreign subsidiaries, or the establishment of such subsidiaries, is also responsive to domestic tax policy, but the data are insufficient to reach any specific conclusions on the matter.
We estimate that a tax policy which raises the after-tax rate of return enough to lead to a dollar of increased domestic investment in the U.S. brings with it between eight and twenty-seven cents of FDI)° These results are consistent with those found in Hartman (1981, 1984) .
Several studies have attempted to study the effect of the 1981-82 investment incentives on effective marginal tax rates (e.g. , see Auerbach (1983) , Feldstein and Jun (1986) , Gravelle (1983) , and Hulten and Robertson (1983) . These studies generally find that the effective corporate tax rate was reduced by about 20% to 35% 11 With a constant before-tax rate-of-return and a pre-ERTA effective tax rate of about 33%, the tax changes increased foreigners' average net return in the U.S. by 10% to 17%. Other things equal, our estimates suggest that return variable is .459. When our equations are transformed into the appropriate units (i.e., when coefficients are divided by 1000; see note in Table 6 ), our estimate of the effect of net rate-of-return in the U.S. on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad is -.016, which is about 4% as large (in absolute value) as .459.
10. This is obtained by multiplying the elasticity of 're" with respect to Foreigners' net return in the U.S. (shown in columns 1 and 2, Table 5A ) by the average value of foreigners' net return in the U.S. (.054) and dividing by the average of the (transformed) 'r (.00355).
11. Studies differ in their estimates because of differing assumptions about expected inflation, discount rates, debt/equity ratios, and hurdle rates, among other things.
this change in net return would bring about approximately a 2% to 4% decline in DIA and an 11% to 20% rise in FDI. This would imply capital inflows of about $0.5 billion to $1.0 billion from smaller DIA and $2 billion to $4 billion in increased FDI. Of course, these figures refer to FDI and DIA out of retained earnings only. Likewise, a tax reform such as H.R.3838, which raises (except perhaps at very high inflation rates) the effective tax rate on U.S. corporate investment, would result in an increase in direct investment abroad by U.S. firms and a decrease in foreign direct investment in the U.S. However, because these results contain no long term dynamic theory of the optimal international location of investment, they should not be taken as any final guide to the impacts of these tax changes on investment patterns.
Finally, the welfare economics of the international location of investment, described in Caves (1982 ), Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1983 ), and Hartman (1984 should be addressed. Domestic economic welfare rises with FDI because the U.S. receives a claim on the rate-ofreturn to foreign capital through the taxation of FDI income.
Conversely, domestic economic welfare falls when U.S. firms substitute DIA for investment at home,12 because the nation then receives only the net-of-foreign-tax return (and that only when it is repatriated) rather than the gross return. These welfare effects are augmented by the beneficial effects on labor productivity of greater investmentforeign or domestic -in the United States. Thus, a reduction in 12. Of course, not all DIA comes at the expense of domestic investment.
taxation of new corporate investment improves welfare through three channels: the standard mechanism, through which lowering the effective marginal tax rate generates new domestic investment opportunities for U.S. firms; a reallocation of the location of investment by U.S. firms toward home and away from abroad; and an increase in FDI. In this paper, we have presented some new evidence that these last two effects are quantitatively important and therefore that it is necessary to consider them in any evaluation of domestic investment incentives.
The welfare effects of tax policy clearly depend on the responsiveness of FDI and DIA to net-of-tax returns. The welfare gains to a tax reduction confined to new corporate investment are positively linked to the responsiveness of DIA and negatively linked to the responsiveness of FDI with respect to net-of-tax returns in the U.S.
Our results suggest that accelerated depreciation or tax credits for new investment which decrease the effective marginal tax rate paid at the corporate level by 10% would, through its effect on the net-ofreturn available to FDI, raise FDI by 9%. Corporate tax revenues from taxation of FDI could be expected to rise correspondinly. Similar, though smaller, revenue effects would occur for DIA. These results refer to investment financed by retained earnings only. Note, however, that tax revenue is greater per dollar of potential DIA diverted to domestic investment than per dollar of FDI, because foreign owners of U.S. capital pay taxes only at the corporate level, while domestic owners are also responsible for state, local, and personal taxes.
Our results suggest that the tax effects on the international location of investment are important. Tax policies, such as ACRS and ITC, which raise the after tax rate-of-return on new investment without losing revenue from previous investment, not only stimulate domestic fixed investment, but also attract additional investment from abroad.
The additional investment supplements the domestic investment impact on productivity and raises corporate tax revenue.
However, our results should be taken as preliminary estimates, not as definitive statements about the long-run impacts of tax policy. 1950:53.56, 1960:68.70, 1970:91.45, 1980:178.42, 1984:223.38 . Notes: a. Foreign Direct Investment is financed either by retention of earnings or by intercompany flows of equity or debt. Retained earnings are negative when dividend payments to equity holders are larger than earnings.
Intercompany flows are net figures and are negative when more funds flow out of the U.S. subsidary than into it. Thus, the ratio listed above may be greater than 100% or less than 0.
In 1982, retained earnings were negative.
b. This ratio measures FDI financed by retained earnings divided by FDI income. It can be negative for the reasons stated in note a. d. Our results use the updated series provided by Feldstein and Jun. Our estimates using the data presented in Hartman (1984) are very close to our results in this table. e. Return on FDI is calculated as income from Foreign Direct Investment divided by end-ofyear Direct Investment Position (in FDI) for the previous year. f. Foreigners' return in the U.S. is defined as the overall gross-rate of return times one minus the tax rate paid at the corporate level.
g. The relative tax term = (l-t')/(l-t), where t' = the total effective tax rate, t = tax rate paid at the corporate level. a. All variables have been defined in Table 4A .
New Results for b. See Table 43 for definition.
